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The United States was of preeminent importance and influence in the global
trading system in the two decades following the end of World War II. But with economic
recovery and expansion in Western Europe and Japan, the U.S. position began to erode.
This erosion has continued in the past two decades as Japan especially has achieved
prominence in world export markets for manufactured goods and as the newly
industrializing countries (NICs) of East Asia - Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and
Taiwan - have burst on the international scene as well.
These broad currents of change in the past 40 years have brought with them a
shift in the focus of U.S. trade policies that mirrors the evolving role of the United States
in the global trading system. After World War II, the United States was instrumental in
the design and implementation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
that provided the framework of rules governing international trade among the GATT
member countries. Although the United States obtained an exemption in the 1950s from
its GATT obligations in connection with its domestic agricultural support programs, it
nonetheless played a strong, leadership role in championing the cause of freer trade in
manufactures in accordance with the basic GATT principles of nondiscrimination and
most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment. U.S. trade policies were guided by the belief that
international political and economic strength and harmony in the non-Communist world
were best fostered by an open and liberal multilateral trading environment. While
reciprocity was an integral feature of efforts by the industrialized countries to reduce
tariffs and other barriers to trade in the course of the periodic multilateral negotiations
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convened under GATT auspices, it is noteworthy that developing countries were granted
special status that permitted them to take advantage of the concessions negotiated among
the industrialized countries without themselves having to reciprocate.
As adjustment pressures have mounted in U.S. manufacturing due to the
increased competition especially from Japan and the East Asian NICs and in U.S.
agriculture because of excess supply conditions internationally, U.S. trade policies have
become less benign. The GATT provisions, especially Article XIX, do make allowance for
temporary protection in cases of unexpected surges in imports that are or threaten to be
injurious to domestic workers and firms. But such protection must be imposed on a
nondiscriminatory basis, and compensation of foreign producers may be required in the
form of a grant of equivalent concessions in order to forestall retaliation. Rather than
following GATT principles and procedures, however, the United States and other
industrialized countries have instead found ways to bypass the GATT on a number of
important occasions, reflecting the perceived domestic political need to find more effective
ways to provide and guarantee support to vested producing interests that were ostensibly
experiencing adjustment problems. Increased tariffs have not been used in these
circumstances. Rather, there has been resort to nontariff measures, including
antidumping and countervailing duties that are condoned under GATT and especially
voluntary export restraints (VERs), which have an ambiguous status under GATT. VERs
are quantitative restrictions on imports that are administered by the exporting countries.
They have a built-in feature of compensation since the profits arising from the restriction
of trade can be captured by exporting interests. This feature of VERs serves to blunt
foreign opposition to the restrictive impact involved.
U.S. trade actions have by no means been confined to irnport restraints. It is
widely believed in both official and private circles in the United States that foreign markets
are rnuch more closed than U.S. markets, and that foreign governments employ a panoply
of measures that give their producers an "unfair" advantage over U.S. producers. As a
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consequence, U.S. authorities have been empowered by legislation to investigate foreign
market barriers and policies and to threaten and actually impose punitive import
reductions unless the foreign government agrees to relax or eliminate the barriers and
change its policies. Special subsidies for U.S. exports of agricultural products have also
been introduced. Recent U.S. trade policy has thus taken on a unilateral and aggressive
stance, which is in sharp contrast to the character and direction of policy in the 1950s and
1960s when the United States played the leadership role in fostering an open and liberal
multilateral trading system based on GATT principles.
While there have been changes in trade policy in the United States and elsewhere
that can be considered to have weakened the multilateral system in important ways, the
system has nonetheless continued to provide the general framework for the conduct of
trade and for multilateral negotiations to be convened periodically. These negotiations
have focused on further liberalization of trade and the design of agreements to monitor
existing nontariff restrictions and to forestall new restrictions from being introduced. The
ongoing Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations provides an opportunity to
review the past accomplishments and unresolved problems of the GATT system. Among
the most important issues in the negotiations is whether and how the mutual interests of
the major industrialized countries and the NICs can be accommodated in a multilateral
setting. At the same time, it is an important question to ask if these interests can perhaps
be better served by means of bilateral and plurilateral trading arrangements that are
alternatives to the GATT, although preserving the most important principles of GATT.
The foregoing remarks are a preview of the issues that shall concern us in the
remainder of the paper. In Section II, we present some empirical data relating to major
changes in the geographic distribution and commodity composition of the main components
of world trade between 1973 and 1986. These changes provide the basis for our treatment
in Sections III-V of the important policy responses to changing trade patterns that have
been undertaken nationally in the major industrialized countries and the NICs,
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multilaterally under GATT auspices in the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds, and bilaterally!
plurilaterally by the major industrialized and developing countries. Section VI concludes
with some remarks on the future of the GATT system.
II. Changes in World Trading Patterns, 1973-1986
In order to provide perspective on the discussion to follow, it is useful to consider
some of the salient developments in world trading patterns that have occurred since the
1970s. In Tables 1-3, we show the exports, imports, and net balances classified by major
commodity groups and geographic areas for the United States, Japan, and the European
Community (EC) and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) combined for the years
1973 and 1986. These data are drawn from GATT sources. The initial year predates the
first oil shock of 1973-74 and the terminal year is the most recent in terms of data
comparability. The absolute amounts of trade are measured in billions of current U.S.
dollars. The percentage distribution by geographic area, given in parentheses, is to be
read across the relevant rows whereas the percentage distribution by commodity group is
to be read down the relevant columns.
Let us first consider the changes in the U.S. trading position shown in Table 1.
The following observations can be made:
1. The United States had a position of near overall trade balance in 1973 and an
overall trade deficit of $176.8 billion in 1986. The U.S. trade deficit in 1986, by
geographic area, was $62.5 billion with Japan, $34.1 billion with Western Europe, and
$55.3 billion with the developing countries (including the oil exporters).
2. While the United States had an export surplus of $8.8 billion in primary
products with Japan in 1986, it had bilateral deficits with Japan of $64.9 billion in
engineering products and $4.1 billion in consumer goods.
3. U.S. trade in primary products with Western Europe in 1986 was roughly
balanced, whereas there were deficits of $7.8 billion in semi-manufactures, $14.9 billion in
engineering products, and $10.6 billion in consumer goods.
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4. Oil imports accounted for a substantial part of the U.S. deficit of $29.4 billion
in primary products with the developing countries in 1986. While U.S. trade in semi-
manufactures and engineering products with the developing countries was more or less
balanced in 1986, the developing countries were evidently major outlets for U.S. exports of
these products, accounting for about one third of the total. The United States had a deficit
of $28.7 billion with the developing countries in its trade in consumer goods (textiles,
clothing, etc.).
5. Most of the U.S. trade in manufactures with the developing countries that is
shown in Table 1 is with the NICs in Latin America (i.e., Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina)
and in East Asia (i.e., Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan). Branson (1987)
has analyzed this pattern of trade in more detail, and, as he has noted (p.55), it appears
that: "On balance, the U.S. exports manufactures to Latin America, the Latin American
NICs sell nonmanufactures (especially Mexican oil) in the world market, the Far Eastern
NICs buy nonmanufactures in the world market and sell manufactures to the United
States."
The main features of Japan's trading position in 1973 and 1986 shown in Table 2
can be summarized as follows:
1. Compared to a position of near balance in 1973, Japan had an overall trade
surplus of $89.7 billion in 1986. It had a bilateral surplus of $54.8 with the United
States, $22.4 billion with Western Europe, and $4.2 billion with the developing countries.
2. Japan's limited endowment of food, materials, and mineral resources (oil
especially) is reflected in its net imports of primary products from the United States ($10.7
billion) and the developing countries ($41.6 billion). Primary products constituted nearly
two- thirds of Japan's imports in 1986.
3. Japan's concentration on exports of engineering products and, to a lesser
extent, on semi-manufactures is clearly evident. The United States and the developing
countries together accounted for about two-thirds of these exports.
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4. Japan's imports of manufactures were about one-third of total imports in
1986. Its imports of engineering products and consumer goods are remarkably low both in
absolute terms and relatively in comparison to the United States and Western Europe,
although these imports have increased quite substantially in 1987-88.
5. According to the more disaggregated analysis in Branson (1987), Japan's
trade in manufactures with the NICs was concentrated primarily in East Asia.
The main features of the trading position of the EC and EFTA combined indicated
in Table 3 are as follows:
1. Netting out intra-EC and EFTA trade, there was an overall surplus of $4.4
billion in 1986 compared to a deficit of $13.7 billion in 1973. Europe's bilateral surplus in
1986 was $19.8 billion with the United States and $2.0 billion with the developing
countries, and there was a bilateral deficit of $27.5 billion with Japan.
2. Europe's net imports of food, materials, and oil are reflected in its primary
product trade with the United States and the developing countries.
3. Europe was a net exporter of semi-manufactures, engineering products, and
consumer goods to the United States. Europe had a deficit of $29.4 billion in its trade in
engineering products with Japan in 1986.
4. Europe was a net exporter of semi-manufactures and engineering products to
the developing countries and a net importer of consumer goods in 1986.
5. According to the more disaggregated analysis in Branson (1987), Europe's
trade in manufactures was in general much less concentrated with the NICs than was the
case for the United States and Japan.
The patterns of trade recorded in Tables 1-3 reflect both long-term and short-term
influences. The long-term influences include changes in national factor endowments,
technology, and government policies that serve to shape the comparative advantage of
each country/region. The short-term influences, which include changes in real exchange
rates and national income, derive especially from changes in government macroeconomic
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policies and will have the greatest impact on the levels of trade rather than the
composition of trade.
If, for example, we wished to explain the pattern of trade in primary products
- food, materials, and minerals (including oil) - and semi-manufactures, the main
determinants would be intercountry differences in the abundance of land, other natural
resources, and the associated investments in physical capital together with government
incentives that are designed to protect or promote production and trade in particular
sectors. Trade in such semi-manufactures as chemicals and in many engineering products
reflects especially the services of the most highly educated, technically trained, and
experienced members of the labor force and business management combined with the
services of the physical plant and equipment that embody the most recent technological
innovations. Scale economies and some elements of market power may also be present in
these industries. Finally, trade in such engineering products as automobiles and household
appliances and in such nondurable goods as textiles and clothing may reflect the fact that
these products can now be produced with relatively standardized production methods. It
has become cheaper accordingly to produce these products in countries that are abundant
in relatively unskilled labor and thus have lower wage costs.
The foregoing considerations may thus help explain why the United States has a
comparative advantage in such primary products as grains, certain livestock products,
tobacco, and cotton and a comparative disadvantage in oil and metals. By the same token,
Western Europe, Japan, and some developing countries may be net importers of a variety
of primary products, although restrictive government policies may be used to protect
domestic producers in many instances. It is also the case that the United States, Japan,
and Western Europe have comparative advantage in a variety of chemicals and
engineering products that embody relatively large inputs of human capital and advanced
technology. Finally, the relatively labor abundant East Asian NICs are presently low cost
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sources of many types of consumer goods and related products that can be produced with
fairly standardized technology.
While international specialization and trade are shaped by the long-run influences
just mentioned, the significance of short-term factors must be recognized as well. In
particular, changes in government macroeconomic policies can result in differential
movements in real exchange rates and in national income and expenditure and thereby
lead to sizable and persistent intercountry trade and current account imbalances. These
short-term influences are clearly evident in the trade deficits recorded in Table 1 for the
United States vis-a-vis Japan, Western Europe, the developing countries, and overall.
In assessing a country's trade performance, it is necessary accordingly to
distinguish changes due to short-term influences that may be driven especially by
macroeconomic forces from the long-run or structural changes in comparative advantage
that may be occurring. These distinctions are especially important since the long-run
adjustment pressures to which workers and firms in import-competing sectors in the
United States have been subjected may have been intensified due to the rapid and sizable
appreciation of the U.S. dollar that took place in the first half of the 1980s. Also, the large
bilateral trade imbalances that the United States has been running, especially with Japan,
are attributable to an important extent to differences in national macroeconomic policies
rather than to Japan's sectoral production and trade policies.'
Having highlighted the changing trade patterns of the major industrialized and
developing countries since the 1970s, we turn next to a discussion of the important
national, multilateral, and bilateral/plurilateral policy responses that have been
undertaken in an effort to expedite, adjust to, or thwart these changing patterns.
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III. National Policy Responses to Changing Trade Patterns
United States and Other Industrialized Countries
We have already indicated that a number of important nontariff actions have
been taken by the United States and other major industrialized countries since the 1970s
for the purpose of limiting imports. The most prominent of these actions include a host of
discretionary policy measures and voluntary export restraints (VERs) that have been
invoked or negotiated in accordance with existing legislative and/or executive authority and
mandates.
In the case of the United States, for example, the chief discretionary policies
include: (1) resort to import relief laws that provide the authority for safeguard measures
to provide temporary relief from imports and investigations of market disruption due to
imports from Communist nations; (2) actions under the laws against unfair trade practices
that provide for antidumping duties on imports that are sold at "less than fair value,"
countervailing duties to offset foreign subsidies, resolution of complaints of unfair methods
of competition such as patent infringement, and resolution of complaints concerning
violations of U.S. rights under trade agreements, including foreign government practices
that inhibit U.S. trade; (3) actions under the law to prevent imports from undermining
domestic agricultural support programs; and (4) actions to regulate imports that may
impair national security.
These various measures, which are rooted in U.S. domestic law, presumably
conform to the Articles of Agreement of the GATT. But since the investigations are
carried out by U.S. government agencies - in particular the Department of Commerce,
International Trade Commission, and the U.S. Trade Representative - there is no
guarantee that the decisions reached will be impartial and equitable in all cases. In fact,
the very existence of these different avenues for complaints and the process of
investigation may well constitute a form of harassment hat could at times be rather costly
to foreign producing interests.
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In addition to the actions based on U.S. trade laws and regulations, import relief
may take the form of a VER that will specify the permissible market shares or quantities
of goods that the exporting countries will be allowed in a given time period. A VER may
be sought by domestic producing interests in cases where the process of administering the
trade laws has not or is unlikely to yield the desired outcome. Since the government and/
or the firms in the exporting country will normally capture at least part of the excess
profits that arise due to the restrictions, there is an element of compensation present in a
VER arrangement, which makes it more palatable to the foreign suppliers than many
other forms of administered protection.
The other major industrialized countries have domestic trade laws and
administrative procedures that share many of the features just described, although of
course the precise authority and mechanisms and the selection of policies will vary
depending upon national political and legal institutions and the structure and influence of
interest groups. This is the case as well for the implementation of VERs.
Because many of the discretionary trade policy measures are framed in terms of
administrative guidelines and practices, which may vary by type of product, industry, and
country, it is difficult to determine precisely how prevalent these barriers to trade are, how
they have changed, and especially what impact they may have on international trade and
economic welfare. One way to assess the prevalence of existing NTBs is provided by the
inventory of these measures that has been compiled by the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD). This inventory classifies the NTBs by commodity
group, and calculations can then be made of the frequency of occurrence of NTBs using as
a measure the value of imports in a given commodity group that are subject to any
identified NTB. This permits trade-weighted frequencies to be determined for given
commodity groups. These frequencies can be expressed as percentages of trade covered by
NTBs. Thus, a designation of zero means that there are no NTBs present, while 100%
means that all trade in a given commodity category is subject to one or more NTBs.
11
Some information on the NTB coverage for sixteen industrialized countries is
given in Table 4.2 These coverage data were calculated using the value of own-country
(1981) imports that were subject to any (1983) NTB at the detailed tariff line level and
then aggregated across product categories.3 The first line in each row of Table 4 refers
to the coverage ratios weighted by imports from developing countries, and the second line
refers to weighting based on imports from industrialized countries. Omitting fuels, the
coverage for all industrial country markets suggests that more than $100 billion of 1981
trade in agricultural products and manufactures was subject to NTBs as of 1983. In
terms of individual countries, column 2 of Table 4 indicates that Belgium-Luxembourg,
France, Australia, and Switzerland had the highest coverage ratios. It is also noteworthy
that the coverage ratios are considerably higher for agricultural products as compared to
manufactures. Among manufactures, textiles (including clothing), iron and steel, and
vehicles have relatively high coverage ratios. Comparisons of the first and second line of
each row show that the NTB coverage ratios for agricultural products tend to be higher
when weighted by industrialized country imports, while the coverage ratios for
manufactures tend to be higher when weighted by imports from developing countries.
It may be of interest to consider VERs separately in view of their importance. A
detailed listing of the various restraint arrangements in operation as of September 1987
can be found in GATT (1987, pp. 55-58 and 99-108). According to this source (p. 55):
"Product categories most heavily affected by these arrangements included steel
and steel products (38), textiles - arrangements concluded outside of MFA
[Multi-Fibre Arrangement] IV (28), agriculture and food products (21),
automobiles and transport equipment (14), electronic products (11), footwear (8)
and machine tools (7). Sixty-nine protect the market of the European Community
or one of its member States, 48 protect the US market, and 7 protect the
Canadian market. The arrangements limit mainly exports from Japan (25
arrangements), Republic of Korea (24), the European Communities (7) and
Taiwan (6)."4
It is unfortunately rather difficult to track movements in protectionism over time
since the existing data do not extend readily to years prior to 1981. Nonetheless, the
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evidence cited in Nogues, Olechowski, and Winters (1985) and in GATT (1987) suggests
that there has been a noticeable increase in the extent of NTBs since 1981.5
It is of interest finally to ask how important existing NTBs may be in terms of
their economic impact on production, trade, and employment by sector and overall in the
major industrialized and developing countries. One way to assess this impact is to
represent the NTBs in terms of tariff or subsidy equivalents by estimating the percentage
changes in prices in the importing countries that result from the NTBs, with appropriate
weighting for trade coverage. Such estimates have been constructed by Deardorff and
Stern (1988) for 18 major industrialized countries and adapted for use in their (1986)
Michigan Model of World Production and Trade. Using these industrialized country NTB
estimates together with existing tariffs, Deardorff and Stern have calculated the sectoral
trade and employment effects for the 18 industrialized and 16 developing countries
included in the Michigan Model of the assumed removal of these NTBs and tariffs. Their
results are summarized in the aggregate by country in Table 5. The principal findings are
as follows:
1. Based on benchmark levels for 1976, exports rise by more than $35 billion,
which is a 4.7% increase. U.S. exports and imports rise by $4.4 billion. The
comparatively small changes noted in the trade of the developing countries reflect
especially the responses to the appreciation of their currencies that would be experienced
in the context of the extensive and concerted liberalization by the industrialized countries
that is being assumed.
2. The gross change in employment for the United States is 184 thousand
workers, which is 0.21% of the 1976 labor force. This is a measure of the number of
workers who would have to change jobs as the result of the assumed liberalization. The
results for the United States are clearly on the low side in comparison to the other
industrialized countries, for which the changes range from less than 1% to over 4% of 1976
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employment, and the developing countries, with changes ranging from less than 1% up to
12.3%.
3. The terms of trade for the United States improve marginally, and there are
somewhat larger improvements especially for Australia, Denmark, Ireland, the
Netherlands, and New Zealand, which reflect the importance of these countries as
agricultural exporters. Terms-of-trade improvements are evident also for many of the
developing countries.
4. The U.S. dollar depreciates by 0.7%. The Japanese yen also depreciates by
3.0% as does the Swiss franc by 1.6%. Some of the currencies of the other industrialized
countries appreciate. The currencies of all the developing countries appreciate, ranging
from 0.3% for Brazil to 16.6% for Hong Kong.
5. Import and therefore consumer prices fall in the United States by 0.1%.
Prices fall by somewhat larger amounts in several other industrialized countries, and they
increase in Japan and Switzerland in response apparently to the assumed removal of
agricultural production subsidies. Prices decline in all the developing countries.
The detailed sectoral results for the United States, which underlie Table 5 and are
given in Deardorff and Stern (1988), indicate the largest positive net employment changes
in U.S. agriculture and net increases and declines in employment of small magnitude
across all other sectors. The details for the other industrialized countries and the
developing countries suggest that the assumed removal of existing tariffs and NTBs might
result in substantial labor market adjustments in a number of important sectors.
The computational results summarized in Table 5 are based on the assumption
that the NICs do not reduce or remove their existing tariffs and/or NTBs. As noted above
this is an option that has been available to them in the Tokyo Round and earlier GATT
multilateral negotiations. However, the major NICs in particular are under increasing
pressure in the current Uruguay Round negotiations to give up their special and
differential treatment and graduate to the status in which they will assume full obligations
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under the GATT and undertake reductions in their trade barriers as well. In this
connection, Deardorff and Stern (1988) have shown that there would be a considerable
expansion of trade overall if both the major industrialized countries and the NICs were
able to liberalize together. We shall return to this issue in our discussion below of the
issues in the Uruguay Round negotiations.
Asian and Latin American NICs
It is evident from our earlier discussion that the NICs have come to play a major
role in the global trading system as suppliers of manufactures, especially consumer goods,
to the industrialized countries as well as importers of semi-manufactures and engineering
products from the industrialized countries. The East Asian NICs, which have registered
the most striking domestic economic performance and increases in exports to the United
States in particular since the 1970s, offer an interesting contrast to the experiences of the
Latin American NICs - Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. This contrast is evident in Table
6, which records rates of growth of gross domestic product (GDP) and per capita GDP for
the periods, 1963-73, 1973-85, and 1963-85. The differences between the Asian and
Latin American experiences are most notable for 1973-85.
The rapid export expansion of the East Asian NICs is shown in Table 7, with the
largest increases for Korea - from 2.0% of the total manufactures exports of the 12
countries listed in 1963 to 23.7% in 1984 - and Taiwan, whose share increased from
6.4% in 1963 to 24.6% in 1984. The shares of manufactures exports of the Southeast
Asian countries increased from 1963 to 1984 while India's share in the exports of both
nonfuel primary products and manufactures declined noticeably. Among the Latin
American NICs, Brazil's export share of manufactures increased from 2.1% in 1963 to
10.2% in 1984.
Although exports are obviously intercorrelated with changes in GDP and there
are many other determinants of a nation's rate of economic growth, there is nonetheless a
considerable body of both cross-section and time-series empirical evidence - see Balassa
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(1988, pp. S277 and S279-80) - that supports the conclusion that intercountry
differences in export expansion are positively related to differences in rates of aggregate
growth. Nonetheless, although the facts speak for themselves, they leave open the obvious
questions of how the East Asian NICs in particular have been able to achieve such
economic success and whether they can serve as models for other developing countries.
The economic success of the East Asian NICs appears to be derived from a
number of interrelated elements, which Bradford (1987, p. 314) has summarized as
follows: "...the evidence suggests.. a supply-push development model with government
playing a key role in stimulating capital formation through rnacropolicies and in
accelerating structural change through sectoral strategies affecting the output and export
mix...." World demand conditions are obviously important as well insofar as they will
define the appropriate price signals and the associated opportunities for access to foreign
markets. But what seems most crucial is "getting the policies right" and not merely
"getting the prices right." International trade is best viewed in this context then as a
"handmaiden of growth" rather than an "engine of growth" in its own right.
Kuznets (1988, p. S31) describes the important links between export-oriented
government policies and economic behavior in the following way:
"Economic behavior is better in export-oriented than in import-substitution
regimes because firms must compete with others in international markets rather
than rely on the protection of sheltered domestic markets. Growth also occurs
through the expansion of more efficient producers rather than the more protected
ones. Export-promotion strategies were initiated in Taiwan and Korea by
devaluation, liberalizing imports, and reducing the web of controls needed to
protect domestic producers. In each case there were benefits from avoiding the
restrictions required by import-substitution policies that had distorted relative
prices and from avoiding the foreign-exchange crises (associated with import
substitution) that had led to stop-go macroeconomic policies. Finally, though the
success of the export-promotion strategies was not assured at first and the new
policies faced opposition from import-substitution interests, 'success breeds
success.' When the new trade regimes eventually succeeded, they received the
public support that has preserved them to this day"
It is interesting to consider whether the East Asian NICs will be able to continue
their rapid rates of expansion of output and exports and what the outlook is for the
emerging NICs of Southeast Asia and the major Latin American NICs. The evolution of
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the industrial structure in nations like Korea and Taiwan has been fostered by government
policies that have provided stable and sectorally neutral incentives and effectively
functioning domestic factor markets. Access to industrialized country markets,
particularly the United States, has been crucial in this process. The maintenance of open
and expanding markets in the major importing countries is therefore vitally important to
the established NICs and the emerging NICs insofar as it encourages their adoption of
more effective domestic policies. Furtheremore, if the NICs can continue to expand their
domestic output and exports, they will absorb larger and more varied imports of semi-
manufactures and engineering products from the industrialized countries especially and
from one another as well.
The data that were presented earlier in Tables 1-3 reinforce the point that the
NICs already account for a sizable proportion of industrialized country exports of
manufactures. It is important to note in this connection that, since the early 1980s, the
Latin American NICs especially have experienced serious difficulties in servicing their
foreign debts. In order to cope with these difficulties, they have instituted substantial
reductions in public expenditures and, as a consequence, there have been significant
declines in their aggregate real output and imports. Since the United States has been a
traditionally large exporter of manufactures to the Latin American NICs, the efforts of
these countries to deal with their debt problems have had a detrimental impact on the U.S.
trading position. It thus seems obvious that the industrialized countries stand to benefit by
increased exports to the NICs just as the NICs will benefit from improved access to the
industrialized country markets. World economic welfare will be enhanced accordingly by
this increased interdependence and the greater specialization and trade that take place.
Based on our earlier discussion of protectionism in the United States and other
industrialized countries, the outlook for the NICs unfortunately appears to be somewhat
ambiguous. It is possible, however, that the situation could be clarified and improved by
means of multilateral negotiations under GATT auspices. To help in assessing this
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possibility, we turn next therefore to a consideration of what was accomplished in the
Tokyo Round from the standpoint of the major industrialized countries and the NICs and
what the prospects are in the current Uruguay Round for an accommodation of interests
between these groups of countries.
IV. Multilateral Responses to Changing Trade Patterns and Policies
Evaluation of the Tokyo Round Negotiations
The Tokyo Round negotiations were convened under GATT auspices in 1973 and
concluded in 1979. The negotiations resulted in an agreement for across-the-board
reductions in tariffs and a series of agreements (codes) covering a variety of nontariff
measures.
Average pre-Tokyo Round (1972) tariffs on industrial products appear in column
(1) of Table 8 for the 18 chief participants in the Tokyo Round negotiations. The average
rates negotiated, called the offer rates, are in column (2). Column (3) records the average
depth of cut by country. A breakdown by major industrial sector and country is given for
the pre-Tokyo Round tariffs and for the offer rates in Deardorff and Stern (1986, pp. 50-
51).
A great deal of attention was devoted in the Tokyo Round to the discussion and
formulation of codes and agreements concerning the use by signatory nations of nontariff
measures of trade intervention. The principal items covered were as follows:
1. Antidumping - This code was aimed at establishing uniformity and
discipline on antidumping practices of signatory nations in order to reduce the trade-
impeding effects of antidumping laws and procedures.
2. Subsidies and countervailing duties - This code states general principles
that subsidies should not harm the trading interests of other countries and that
countervailing duties, to offset foreign subsidies, should not impede trade unjustifiably.
The United States agreed in principle to a test of "material injury" before imposing
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countervailing duties, although it has not done so in a number of investigations in cases in
which developing countries did not accept the commitments of this code.
3. Product standards - Under this code, countries agreed generally, when
introducing new standards, to follow international standards for health, safety, consumer
and environmental protection, etc., and to refrain from establishing standards that impede
trade.
4. Government procurement - This code is designed to open up public
procurement to competitive bidding by both domestic and foreign firms.
5. Customs valuation - This code set up consistent valuation practices for
trade based on a "transaction" price. The point is to limit arbitrary uplifts in valuing
imports for duty purposes and to reduce uncertainty that traders face regarding the duty
they will have to pay.
6. Import licensing procedures - This code encourages governments to
simplify the administration of import licensing and to minimize practices that discriminate
against foreign suppliers.
Besides these nontariff codes, the Tokyo Round agreement contains provisions for
reform of the GATT framework and minor reductions in NTBs on specific products. There
was also an agreement o remove certain trade impediments on civil aircraft.
There was an unsuccessful attempt in the Tokyo Round to draft a safeguards code
covering policies to deal with market disruption due to sudden upsurges in imports. The
European Community in particular wanted the authority to apply safeguards selectively
by product and supplying country, whereas the United States favored the
nondiscriminatory application of safeguards measures. Discussions on this code are being
continued in the Uruguay Round. The lack of agreement on a safeguards code was not the
only failure in the Tokyo Round, however, for this Round also left intact practically all the
important nontariff restrictions governing trade in agricultural products and foodstuffs,
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textiles and clothing, footwear, iron and steel products, consumer electronic products, and
shipbuilding.
The tariff reductions negotiated in the Tokyo Round were to be implemented over
a seven-year period beginning in 1980. In order to analyze the economic effects that might
be expected, Deardorff and Stern (1986) used the Michigan Model mentioned above for
simulation purposes. Assuming that the tariff reductions were to be carried all at once,
according to their calculations (pp. 53-59), exports of the major trading countries covered
by the model would rise by about $13 billion, which is 1.6% of the 1976 base level.
Practically all of this increase is accounted for by the industrialized countries. The gross
change in employment. which measures the number of workers who would have to change
jobs, was well under 1% of 1976 employment in all the industrialized countries. Changes
in the terms of trade, exchange rates, and domestic prices were all shown to be
comparatively small. Since, as mentioned, the tariff reductions were in fact to be phased
in over seven years, the actual effects in any one year would be extremely small.
The smallness of these results is not surprising if we consider that the Tokyo
Round tariff reductions were themselves quite small since average tariffs were to be cut
from approximately 8 to 6%. Granting this, domestic prices might not even fall by the full
extent of the tariff reductions if changes in world prices and exchange rates were taken
into account. Furthermore, the impacts would be diminished because the effects of the
tariff reductions on the prices of outputs and inputs would be offsetting. Since, as we have
noted, most NTBs remained unaffected by the Tokyo Round negotiations, the Tokyo Round
may have been of limited significance especially for the developing countries whose exports
were (and continue to be) constrained by the existing nontariff restrictions.
The Tokyo Round codes noted above constitute a major accomplishment in
international commercial diplomacy insofar as they explicitly extend trade discipline to, or
define more precisely existing discipllne and rules for, specific nontariff intervention
measures. The codes are essentially exercises in international rule-making and have as
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their primary objectives the reduction of trade barriers and the enhancement of certainty
and transparency and, ideally, restraint by governments in the use of nontariff measures.
Because the codes relate to the clarification and improvement of rules and procedures, it is
difficult to evaluate their commercial impact in quantitative terms. Nonetheless, there has
been nearly a decade of experience in the operation of most of the codes so that some
qualitative assessment of their usefulness is possible.
Each of the codes has been reviewed in some detail by Stern, Jackson, and
Hoekman (1988). They conclude that the customs valuation and standards codes
especially and to some extent the antidumping and government procurement codes have
resulted in greater harmonization and consistency of national regulations. As a
consequence of the increased predictability and greater uniformity of national practices,
transactions costs of doing business may have been reduced to an important extent. The
regular meetings of the code committees under GATT auspices, exchange of information,
and resolution of many disputes by means of consultation have created a climate of
cooperation among the code participants.
The codes that are operating least well are those relating to subsidies, trade in
civil aircraft, and import licensing. The difficulties stem especially from the contentious
nature of the policies involved in these codes that impinge directly on national sovereignty
and the governmental pursuit of domestic economic and political objectives. The subsidies
code that was negotiated had some notable ambiguities, including just what subsidies were
to be covered, how a subsidy was to be defined, how agricultural subsidies especially
should be treated, and what exemptions were appropriate for developing countries. The
effectiveness of the civil aircraft code has been limited because it has not curtailed the use
of subsidies and the political marketing of aircraft. The code governing import licensing
has not been accepted by most developing countries since they are not willing to give up
this form of protection. Also, the licensing code does not deal with export restraints that,
as noted, have become a major form of protection used by the industrialized countries.
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The Tokyo Round codes are intended to reflect the basic GATT principles of
nondiscrimination, the desirability of transparency in the choice of intervention measures,
sanctioning of actions against unfair trade, and surveillance and consultation regarding
restrictive actions. At the same time, the codes have been structured so as to bind only
the signatories even though they are intended to be applied on a nondiscriminatory basis.
Furthermore, the United States in particular has decided to interpret and apply its
obligations under the subsidies, standards, and procurement codes only to other signatory
nations as a means of exerting leverage on nonsignatory, particularly developing, nations
to alter their policies that may not be in conformance with the codes.
While all of the industrialized countries have signed most of the codes, the
participation of developing countries has been more limited. Much could be gained if all
the major NICs could be induced to become parties especially to the subsidies, customs
valuation, and licensing codes. The advantage of greater participation by these countries
would be to enhance their influence in and improve the operation and effectiveness of
particular codes. If more countries were to sign certain codes, they would presumably
have to adapt their domestic policies to conform to the code obligations. This would be
beneficial to them if it made for improved allocative efficiency, although there could be
some costs involved as well since there would be domestic institutional constraints that
would have to be overcome. Expanded developing country membership in the existing
codes and the possible negotiation of new codes are among the issues to be addressed in the
Uruguay Round negotiations to which we now turn.
Issues in the Uruguay Round Negotiations
The agenda for the Uruguay Round negotiations was established on the occasion
of the ministerial meeting that was convened in Punta del Este (Uruguay) from September
15-20, 1986. Part I of the ministerial declaration included the establishment of
negotiating groups to deal with the following issues relating to trade in goods: tariffs; non-
tariff measures; natural resource-based products; textiles and clothing; agriculture; tropical
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products; GATT Articles; MTN agreements and arrangements; safeguards; subsidies and
countervailing measures; trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, including
trade in counterfeit goods; trade-related investment measures; dispute settlement; and
functioning of the GATT system. Part II of the declaration established a separate
negotiating group on trade in services.
Several of the issues on the Uruguay Round agenda would appear to be fairly
uncontroversial. These include tariff reductions, natural resource products, tropical
products, improving the operation of the Tokyo Round codes, improving dispute settlement
procedures, and improving the function of the GATT system. But other issues are
definitely more controversial, especially nontariff measures, textiles and clothing,
safeguards, subsidies, intellectual property rights, trade-related investment measures, and
services.
We have mentioned already that the developing countries have heretofore not
been required to make reciprocal concessions in the GATT negotiations. However, in view
of the increased role that the major NICs are now playing especially as exporters of
manufactured goods, there are bound to be pressures exerted on them to accept more fully
the obligations under GATT. What this might entail first is that the major NICs agree to
graduate to the status of full membership in the GATT by giving up their "special and
differential treatment" as developing countries. If they undertook commitments to bind
their existing levels of protection and, further, offered to reduce this protection, this would
help to set the stage for potentially fruitful negotiations with the industrialized countries.
It is interesting in this light to consider whether there are possible tradeoffs or
linkages between issues that could be made that would be mutually beneficial to the major
industrialized countries and the NICs.6 The issue of safeguards is crucially important to
the NICs, especially in light of the increasing use of VERs by the United States and other
industrialized countries to limit imports of various types of manufactured goods. The
sticking point in the Tokyo Round negotiations was whether safeguards restrictions should
23
be selective by product and supplying country, which was the EC position, or be
nondiscriminatory, which was the U.S. position. Since the implementation of VERs has
been selective in practice, it is conceivable that a safeguards agreement could be negotiated
that would bridge the EC and U.S. positions.
In order to reach agreement on safeguards, it would be necessary for the
industrialized countries to agree to discontinue existing VERs, including the Multi-Fibre
Arrangement (MFA). In this event, the industrialized countries would be permitted to use
temporary and degressive protection, subject to the demonstration of material injury.
Market access for NIC manufactures would thus be more assured than under present
circumstances. As for the major NICs, they might offer, as a quid pro quo, to bind their
tariffs under GATT and also agree to reduce existing protection in order to appeal to the
industrialized countries.
It is also possible that a services agreement might provide a basis for linkage with
a safeguards agreement, even though services have been put on a separate track in the
Uruguay Round agenda.7 The attainment of a services agreement is an important
objective of the United States in the Uruguay Round, and this objective appears to be
shared by both the EC and Japan. If a services agreement were to be negotiated, the
participation of the major NICs could be premised on reaching an acceptable agreement on
safeguards and related issues, involving as mentioned the discontinuance of VERs
including the MFA. The fact that some countries benefit from the rents provided by the
VER arrangements would have to be considered in an effort to reach an acceptable
agreement.
There may be other possible linkages besides those already mentioned that could
be pursued in the Uruguay Round. The United States, EC, and Japan have mutual
interests in the liberalization of nontariff restrictions on trade in selected manufactures,
reductions in agricultural production subsidies and export subsidies, and clarification of and
more effective rules governing subsidies on manufactures. These issues are probably of
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most direct concern to the industrialized countries themselves, although there are certainly
some developing countries whose interests would be served by any agreements that might
be reached. There are obviously many cross currents in the Uruguay Round negotiations,
and it can be expected that tradeoffs and linkages among the various issues will be
pursued by the major participating countries and blocs as the negotiations reach their
climax.
V. Bilateral and Plurilateral Responses to Changing Trade Patterns
Multilateral negotiations under GATT auspices are inherently time consuming. It
is difficult to obtain consensus among the GATT members on the agenda items, and it is
even more difficult to conclude negotiations successfully. Moreover, the GATT process for
investigating and resolving disputes is time consuming and frustrating, especially when the
governments involved perceive that their interests are ill served in a multilateral setting.
Under these circumstances, they are strongly tempted to consider seriously bilateral and/
or plurilateral approaches to negotiations for trade liberalization and the resolution of
disputes.
As Baldwin (1987, p. 39) has pointed out, an obvious advantage of the bilateral/
plurilateral approaches is that it is easier and quicker both to agree on a negotiating
agenda and to complete negotiations. And, the participating countries are better able to
choose issues directly related to their mutual trading interests. Furthermore, like-minded
countries are able to agree on a more extensive package of mutual liberalization than is
feasible in the larger GATT setting in which the interests of many countries are involved.
Finally, bilateral negotiations may be especially appealing in addressing issues of "unfair"
trade when a country perceives, rightly or wrongly, that it is being injured by some foreign
trade practice. If action is taken bilaterally, pressure may be exerted directly on the
offending country to change its unfair practice obviating the process required under the
GATT.
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Baldwin also notes some important disadvantages of undertaking bilateral/
plurilateral negotiations. The GATT rules normally require that any preferential
elimination of tariffs and other restrictions must apply to the bulk of the trade of the
countries involved. This means that a customs union or free trade area will have to be
established to satisfy this requirement. If this is not done, any trade concessions granted
will have to be made available to all members according to the most-favored-nation (MFN)
principle. To avoid free riding, countries might seek to negotiate on products for which
they are each other's main suppliers. If equivalent concessions are then sought so as to
maintain a position of balanced trade, the negotiations may become very cumbersome
since it could be difficult to agree on an acceptable package that satisfied the. desired
equivalence.
If trade disputes are to be settled bilaterally, Baldwin points out that there is a
danger that large countries may bully smaller countries into taking actions that may not
necessarily be equitable or equivalent. This will be the case especially if there is
significant interest group lobbying and control intended to capture rents in particular
circumstances. There is a possibility, finally, that unilateral threats and actions may
exacerbate disputes and trigger retaliation when the countries are similar in size. If
retaliatory measures are in fact carried out, it is likely that everyone will be made worse
off.
Given the advantages and drawbacks of the bilateral/plurilateral approaches to
negotiations, it is interesting to consider recent actions by the United States especially.
These actions include the negotiation of free trade arrangements (PTA) with Israel and
Canada, the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), changes in the U.S. Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP), special tariff arrangements for imported products containing U.S.
components, and a variety of investigations of alleged unfair trade practices of foreign
governments.8
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The U.S.-Israel FTA became effective on September 1, 1985. It involves a
phased elimination of existing bilateral tariffs over a 10-year period and, what is especially
noteworthy, it covers bilateral relations involving trade in services, intellectual property
rights, and trade-related investment performance requirements. The undertaking of this
agreement would appear to reflect a variety of motives from the standpoint of the United
States. The possible motives include the desire to match the preferential arrangements
between Israel and the EC, to demonstrate how agreements covering services and other
topics could be shaped as a potential model for multilateral negotiations, and perhaps to
make a political statement to reinforce the close ties between the two nations. Since U.S.
trade with Israel is comparatively small, this agreement cannot be expected to have more
than a marginal effect economically on the United States, although the effect on Israel
could be more noticeable.
Negotiations covering the U.S.-Canada FTA were completed in October 1987.
The agreement has since been approved by the U.S. Congress, but it has been held up in
the Canadian Senate. It is supposed to take effect on January 1, 1989, but this may be
delayed pending the outcome of a federal election to be held in Canada that will serve in
large measure as a referendum on the FTA. The U.S.-Canada FTA envisions phased
removal of bilateral tariffs over a 10-year period, dismantling of certain bilateral NTBs,
and perhaps of greatest importance some potentially far reaching agreements covering the
harmonization of antidumping and subsidy-countervailing duty procedures and policies,
settlement of bilateral disputes by binationally appointed panels, financial and other
services, trade-related investment performance requirements, and U.S. access to energy
supplies.
The U.S.-Canada FTA was initiated in large measure by Canada, which is the
single largest trading partner of the United States. The bulk of Canada's export and
import trade is with the United States. The PTA can be viewed broadly as an effort by
Canada to obtain security of access to the U.S. market. From the U.S. standpoint, the
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FTA provided an opportunity to exercise some discipline over Canadian policies involving
subsidies and direct foreign investment requirements, more assured access to Canadian
energy supplies, and the liberalization of Canadian regulations covering banking, financial
services, telecommunications, and other services.
Analysis of the potential economic effects of the FTA by Brown and Stern (1988)
suggests that bilateral tariff elimination will be welfare enhancing to both countries and
more so to Canada, although there could be some noticeable adjustment problems in some
of Canada's relatively labor intensive sectors. It is difficult to determine what impact the
FTA will have on the procedures and policies governing trade and investment transactions
and disputes since this will depend on how the FTA is administered and the extent to
which the agreement will foster mutual respect and trust between the two nations. Of
course, all of this will become academic if the FTA is not accepted by the Canadian
electorate. As in the case of the U.S.-Israel FTA, the U.S.-Canada FTA may have an
important demonstration effect on a variety of items on the Uruguay Round agenda.
The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) dates from August 1983. It was an effort
designed to further relations with this group of small island nations that were deemed to
be politically important to the United States. It represents one of three U.S. preferential
arrangements involving imports from developing countries, the others being the U.S. GSP
and special duty exemptions covering U.S. components in imported products assembled in
foreign countries and then returned to the United States for additional processing. In
evaluating these various preferential arrangements, it is important to note that they are
carefully circumscribed and thus exclude most labor intensive manufactured imports such
as textiles, clothing, and leather products. Furthermore, since its inception in 1974, the
U.S. GSP has been of greatest benefit to the East Asian NICs. This will change, however,
beginning in 1989 when imports from these countries will no longer be eligible for GSP
treatment. In view of the exemption of most labor intensive consumer manufactures from
preferential treatment and the fact that U.S. tariffs on most other products are in any
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case already quite low, there may not be much scope for negotiating preferential
arrangements with the United States that would be beneficial to developing countries.
With the very large increase in the U.S. trade deficit in the 1980s, both import-
competing and export industries experienced considerable problems of adjustment. These
problems were manifested politically in terms of pressures to limit imports in a number of
important sectors and to institute actions aimed at foreign government policies that were
deemed detrimental to U.S. export interests. As a consequence, U.S. trade policy has
taken on a shrill and often threatening tone that is a marked departure from the more
benign quality that characterized the United States when it was in a position of leadership
in enhancing the effectiveness of the multilateral trading system.
Our discussion of U.S. policies and experiences with bilateral and plurilateral
trade policy initiatives suggests that there are special circumstances motivating the free
trade arrangements with Israel and Canada that may not lend themselves readily to
similar arrangements with other countries. It also appears that there may not be much
scope for the expansion of preferential arrangements so long as the product coverage of
these arrangements remains limited. Moreover, if the product coverage were expanded,
the benefits of preferential arrangments would be diluted the more countries that were
eligible to participate in the arrangements. Finally, while the U.S. concern with the
alleged unfair policies of its major trading partners is understandable, it is by no means
clear that unilateral U.S. threats and actions are the best means for alleviating the
situation.
It is of interest briefly to consider the positions of Western Europe, Japan, and the
NICs from a bilateral/plurilateral perspective. The EC and EFTA have been preoccupied
over the years with issues of intra-European integration. This is likely to continue
especially in light of the objective to remove internal barriers to trade and factor mobility
in the EC by 1992. Japan's major policy concerns have been with the United States and
the East Asian NICs. While there have been efforts to foster regional integration in
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Southeast Asia and Latin America, the efforts thus far have been of limited significance
economically. One obvious reason for this is simply that the fortunes of the countries in
these regions are dependent to the largest extent on their relations with the industrialized
countries rather than with each other.
VI. Directions for the Future
There have been dramatic changes in global trading patterns in the past two
decades especially from the U.S. perspective. These changes reflect both long-term
structural influences associated with changing relative factor endowments, technology, and
related government policies, and short-term influences driven in large measure by
macroeconomic policies and adjustments. There has been a shift in U.S. trade policies that
mirrors the changing role of the United States in the multilateral trading system from a
position of leadership and champion of the ideal of freer trade to a position in which trade
policy actions are increasingly shaped to respond to domestic interests.
Despite this shift in the focus of U.S. trade policies, the GATT multilateral
system has continued to function, making it possible for Japan, the East Asian NICs and
to a lesser extent others to have had stunning export successes. Access to the U.S.
market has been the key to these developments. It is important to understand in this
connection that the U.S. trade imbalances of the 1980s are in large measure a reflection of
the U.S. macroeconomic imbalances. As these imbalances diminish, the long-term
structural factors will come to the fore in the evolution of the trading system. What will
be needed then is a vision of how the system should be adapted to accommodate the
adjustments that will be required in the course of time.
The major challenge in the trading system today is to find more effective means of
adjustment so that it will be possible to reverse the increasing use of administered
protection and the resort to VERs by the United States and other industrialized countries
that so often work to the detriment of small countries. The GATT is designed to shield
small countries from the sometimes capricious and damaging actions of larger and more
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powerful countries. However, protectionism and the increasing resort to selective threats
and restrictions suggest that the ideals of the GATT system have been seriously
compromised. The appropriate course of action is to prevent the further fragmentation of
the GATT system and to embark on a concerted effort to reinvigorate and strengthen the
system. The negotiations in the Uruguay Round and beyond are in the right direction.
But meaningful negotiations require political commitment not only by the United States
but by all the major trading countries.
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Footnotes
1See Saxonhouse and Stern (1989) for an empirical analysis in support of this assertion.
2According to Nogues, Olechowski, and Winters (1985), five major types of NTBs that
impinge directly on imports at national borders are included, as follows: (1) measures
increasing the landed price of imports (tariff quotas, seasonal tariffs); (2) measures for
enforcement of decreed prices (variable levies, minimum price systems, voluntary export
price restraints; (3) quantitative import restrictions (prohibitions, quotas, discretionary
import authorizations); (4) VERs; and (5) other import management measures (price-
volume surveillance, antidumping and countervailing duties.
3Nogues, Olechowski, and Winters also calculate unweighted frequency measures of
NTBs as well as measures using world imports as weights. These produce different levels
as compared to using own-country imports as weights, but all three measures are similar
qualitatively.
4Separate calculations by Nogues, Olechowski, and Winters suggest that major borrowing
developing countries are strongly affected by NTBs. Also, the NICS apparently have
higher coverage ratios than developing countries on average. Finally, of all the NTBs
considered, VERs are shown to have a predominant impact on the coverage ratios for
manufactures with respect to the developing countries especially.
5A similar conclusion is reached in Balassa and Balassa (1984) and in USTR (1984, esp.
pp. 53-58 and 119-125). Bergsten and Cline (1983), esp. pp. 70-72) consider the path of
NTB protection in the United States from 1967 to 1982. They note that import quotas on
steel, oil, meat, and sugar were phased out after 1974, and restrictions on television sets
and footwear were lifted after 1981. After 1980, however, protection was increased in
automobiles, textiles, sugar, and steel. They conclude (p. 72): "Overall, the trend in
protection over the last several years has been at best ambiguous, and more probably
toward intensification....Nonetheless, it would appear that the pressures for protection
since the mid-1970s have increased relatively more than has actual protection."
6The following discussion is based in large part on Hoekman (1988b), which is a detailed
treatment of the scope for agreement on the issues of safeguards, services, and agriculture
in the Uruguay Round negotiations.
7See Hoekman (1988a) for an argument and proposal for linking safeguards and services.
Details on these various actions are given in USITC (1988).
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Table 1
United States Trade by Areas and Commodity Groups, 1973 and 1986
(Billions of U.S. Dollars and Percentages; Exports F.O.B. and Imports C.I.F.)
Western Developing Total
Japan Europe Countries Worlda
Ex- Im- Bal- Ex- Im- Bal- Ex- Im- Bal- Ex- Im- B
ports % ports % ance ports % ports % ance ports % ports % ance ports % ports % an
Primary products
1973 5.2 (63.4) 0.5 (4.8) 4.7 8.2 (38.9) 3.8 (18.6) 5.4 6.5 (31.6) 13.8 (62.7) -7.3 24.7 (35.2) 27.0 (36.7)
(%) (21.1) (1.9) (33.2) (14.1) (26.3) (51.1) (100.0)
1986 10.1 (44.1) 1.3 (1.5) 8.8 14.1 (24.3) 14.0 (15.2) 0.1 17.2 (25.0) 46.6 (37.6) -29.4 48.1 (23.5) 85.6 (22.4) -
(%) (21.0) (1.5) (29.3) (16.4) (35.8) (54.4) (100.0)
Semi-manufactures
1973 0.9 (11.0) 1.8 (17.1) -0.9 3.1 (14.7) 4.3 (21.1) -0.8 3.3 (16.0) 1.6 (7.3) 1.7 9.9 (14.1) 10.7 (14.5)
(%) (9.1) (16.8) (34.1) (40.2) (33.3) (15.0) (100.0) (100.0)
1986 4.2 (18.3) 6.3 (7.4) -2.1 9.1 (15.7) 16.9 (18.3) -7.8 11.3 (16.4) (9.7) (7.8) 1.6 31.4 (15.3) 46.2 (12.1) -
(%) (13.4) (13.6) (29.0) (36.6) (36.0) (21.0) (100.0)
Engineering products
1973 1.7 (20.7) 6.8 (64.8) -5.1 8.3 (39.3) 8.5 (41.7) -0.2 8.5 (41.3) 2.6 (11.8) 5.9 30.4 (43.3) 25.4 (34.5)
(%) (5.6) (26.8) (27.3) (33.5) (28.0) (10.2) (100.0)
1986 7.1 (31.0) 72.0 (84.3) -64.9 29.5 (50.9) 44.4 (48.2) -14.9 32.5 (47.3) 33.4 (26.9) -0.9 105.4 (51.5) (182.3) (47.8) -
(%) (6.7) (39.5) (28.0) (24.4) (30.8) (18.3) (100.0)
Consumer goods
1973 0.3 (3.7) 1.3 (12.4) -1.0 1.0 (4.7) 3.2 (15.7) -2.2 0.9 (4.4) 3.7 (16.8) -2.8 3.4 (4.8) 8.7 (11.8)
(%) (8.8) (14.9) (29.4) (36.8) (26.5) (42.5) (100.0)
1986 0.9 (3.9) 5.0 (5.9) -4.1 3.1 (5.3) 13.7 (14.9) -10.6 3.6 (5.2) 32.3 (26.0) -28.7 10.5 (5.1) 58.0 (15.2) -
(%) (8.6) (8.6) (29.5) (23.6) (34.3) (55.7) (100.0)
Total tradeb
1973 8.2 (100.0) 10.5 (100.0) -2.3 21.1 (100.0) 20.4 (100.0) 0.7 20.6 (100.0) 22.0 (100.0) -1.4 70.2 (100.0) 73.6 (100.0)
(95) (11.7) (14.3) (30.1) (27.7) (29.3) (29.9) (100.0)
1986 22.9 (100.0) 85.4 (100.0) -62.5 58.0 (100.0) 92.1 (100.0) -34.1 68.7 (100.0) 124.0 (100.0) -55.3 204.6 (100.0) 381.4 (100.0) -1













aIncludes Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the Eastern Trading Area.
bIncludes commodities not classified according to kind.
Source: Adapted from GATT, International Trade 1986-87; 1981-82.
Table 2
Japanese Trade by Areas and Commodity Groups, 1973 and 1986
(Billions of U.S. Dollars and Percentages; Exports F.O.B. and Imports C.I.F.)
United Western Developing Total
States Europe Countries Worlda
Ex- Im- Bal- Ex- Im- Bal- Ex- Im- Bal- Ex- Im- Bal-
ports % ports % ance ports % ports % ance ports % ports % ance ports % ports % ance
Primary products
1973 0.4 (4.2) 5.8 (62.4) -5.4 0.3 (4.5) 0.7 (17.1) -0.4 1.0 (7.4) 13.8 (85.2) -12.8 2.0 (5.4) 28.3 (73.9) -26.
(%) (20.0) (20.5) (15.0) (2.5) (50.0) (48.8) (100.0) (100.0)
1986 1.1 (1.4) 11.8 (44.5) -10.7 0.5 (1.3) 2.9 (19.0) -2.4 2.8 (4.7) 44.4 (79.9) -41.6 5.2 (2.5) 77.3 (64.7) -72.
(%) (21.2) (15.3) (9.6) (3.8) (53.8) (57.4) (100.0) (100.0)
Semi-manufactures
1973 1.5 (15.6) 1.1 (11.8) 0.4 1.1 (16.7) 1.1 (26.8) 0.0 4.2 (30.9) 0.7 (4.3) 3.5 8.7 (23.6) 3.5 (9.1) 5.
(%) (17.2) (31.4) (12.6) (31.4) (48.3) (20.0) (100.0) (100.0)
1986 5.7 (7.0) 5.0 (18.9) 0.7 3.3 (8.8) 4.9 (32.0) -1.6 13.3 (22.2) 4.1 (7.4) 9.2 29.4 (14.1) 15.9 (13.3) 13.
(%) (19.4) (31.4) (11.2) (30.8) (45.2) (25.8) (100.0) (100.0)
Engineering products
1973 6.4 (66.7) 1.9 (20.4) 4.5 4.5 (68.2) 1.4 (34.1) 3.1 6.3 (46.3) 0.3 (1.9) 6.0 21.6 (58.5) 3.6 (9.4) 18.
(%) (29.6) (52.8) (20.8) (38.9) (29.2) (8.3) (100.0) (100.0)
1986 69.2 (85.1) 8.1 (30.6) 61.1 30.9 (82.0) 4.7 (30.7) 26.2 38.1 (63.7) 2.2 (4.0) 35.9 158.9 (76.0) 15.3 (12.8) 143.
(%) (43.5) (52.9) (19.4) (30.7) (24.0) (14.4) (100.0) (100.0)
Consumer goods
1973 1.1 (11.5) 0.4 (4.3) 0.7 0.6 (9.1) 0.8 (19.5) -0.2 1.9 (14.0) 1.2 (7.4) 0.7 4.3 (11.7) 2.8 (7.3) 1.
(%) (25.6) (14.3) (14.0) (28.6) (44.2) (42.9) (100.0) (100.0)
1986 4.4 (5.4) 1.0 (3.8) 3.4 2.7 (7.2) 2.6 (17.0) 0.1 5.0 (8.4) 4.2 (7.6) 0.8 13.6 (6.5) 9.1 (7.6) 4.
(%) (32.4) (11.0) (19.9) (28.6) (36.8) (46.2) (100.0) (100.0)
Total tradeb
1973 9.6 (100.0) 9.3 (100.0) 0.3 6.6 (100.0) 4.1 (100.0) 2.5 13.6 (100.0) 16.2 (100.0) -2.6 36.9 (100.0) 38.3 (100.0) -
(%) (26.0) (24.3) (17.9) (10.7) (36.9) (42.3) (100.0) (100.0)
1986 81.3 (100.0) 26.5 (100.0) 54.8 37.7 (100.0) 15.3 (100.0) 22.4 59.8 (100.0) 55.6 (100.0) 4.2 209.1 (100.0) 119.4 (100.0) 89.5
(%) (38.9) (22.2) (18.0) (12.8) (28.6) (46.6) (100.0) (100.0)
aIncludes Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the Eastern Trading Area.
bIncludes commodities not classified according to kind.






European Community and EFTA Trade by Areas and Commodity Groups, 1973 and 1986
(Billions of U.S. Dollars and Percentages; Exports F.O.B. and Imports C.I.F.)
United Developing Total
States Japan Countries Worlda
Ex- Im- Bal- Ex- Im- Bal- Ex- Im- Bal- Ex- Im-
ports % ports % ance ports % ports % ance ports % ports % ance ports % ports % an
Primary products
1973 2.9 (15.9) 7.8 (37.5) -4.9 0.6 (17.1) 0.3 (5.1) 0.3 4.5 (14.5) 37.1 (85.7) -32.6 13.1 (15.0) 62.6 (61.8) -4
(%) (22.1) (12.5) (4.6) (0.5) (34.4) (59.3) (100.0)
1986 11.3 (13.4) 14.7 (22.9) 3.4 2.5 (18.2) 0.5 (1.2) 2.0 17.1 (14.4) 79.5 (68.0) -62.4 42.3 (14.3) 134.8 (46.4) -9
(%) (26.7) (10.9) (5.9) (0.4) (40.4) (59.0) (100.0)
Semi-manufactures
1973 3.9 (21.4) 3.3 (15.9) 0.6 1.0 (28.6) 1.1 (18.6) -0.1 8.2 (26.5) 2.0 (4.6) 6.2 21.3 (24.3) 10.5 (10.4) 1
(%) (18.3) (31.4) (4.7) (10.5) (38.5) (19.0) (100.0) (100.0)
1986 15.4 (18.3) 10.4 (16.2) 5.0 4.4 (32.1) 3.6 (8.7) 0.8 30.8 (25.9) 7.8 (6.7) 23.0 71.9 (24.4) 31.7 (10.9) 4
(%) (21.4) (32.8) (6.1) (11.4) (42.8) (24.6) (100.0)
Engineering products
1973 8.8 (48.4) 8.2 (39.4) 0.6 1.3 (37.1) 3.8 (64.4) -2.5 15.4 (49.7) 1.0 (2.3) 14.4 40.1 (45.8) 17.6 (17.4) 2
(%) (21.9) (46.6) (3.2) (21.6) (38.4) (5.7) (100.0)
1986 44.2 (52.6) 33.8 (52.6) 10.4 4.4 (32.1) 33.8 (82.0) -29.4 57.1 (48.0) 12.2 (10.4) 44.9 141.9 (48.1) 87.0 (29.9) 5
(%) (31.1) (38.9) (3.1) (38.9) (40.2) (14.0) (100.0)
Consumer goods
1973 *2.5 (13.7) 1.2 (5.8) 1.3 0.6 (17.1) 0.7 (11.9) -0.1 2.7 (8.7) 3.1 (7.2) -0.4 13.1 (15.0) 10.6 (10.5)
(%) (19.1) (11.3) (4.6) (6.6) (20.6) (29.2) (100.0)
1986 12.0 (14.3) 3.6 (5.6) 8.4 2.2 (16.1) 3.0 (7.3) -0.8 11.4 (9.6) 16.1 (13.8) -4.7 32.6 (11.1) 33.1 (11.4) -
(%) (36.8) (10.9) (6.7) (9.1) (35.5) (48.9) (100.0)
Total tradeb
1973 18.2 (100.0) 20.8 (100.0) -2.6 3.5 (100.0) 5.9 (100.0) -2.4 31.0 (100.0) 43.3 (100.0) -12.3 87.6 (100.0) 101.3 (100.0) -1
(%) (21.5) (21.5) (4.1) (6.1) (36.6) (44.8) (100.0) (100.0)
1986 84.1 (100.0) 64.3 (100.0) 19.8 13.7 (100.0) 41.2 (100.0) -27.5 118.9 (100.0) 116.9 (100.0) 2.0 294.9 (100.0) 290.5 (100.0)
(%) (28.5) (22.1) (4.6) (14.2) (40.3) (40.2) (100.0) (100.0)
aIncludes Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the Eastern Trading Area. Intra-EC and EFTA trade is excluded from total world. Data for 1973 refer to
the EC(10) and for 1986 to the EC(12) and are thus not strictly comparable.
bIncludes commodities not classified according to kind.
















Major Industrial Country NTl Coverage Ratioss
by Product Category for Developing and Industrial Countries, 1983
IaduewlmI AlN AuL.lem lessand Uscuimilhst of
atsny maesproduce hile Agriculture Mamufacturm 7butlw Footwear sl m clmery Vehicles manufactures
1C25.4 269 369 29.9 68.0 9.9 31.9 7.0 8.4 14.7
15.6 18.9 47.7 15.2 15.6 0.6 51.1 15.8 49.9 93
Selgham.Lusxebourg 36.1 45.1 35.1 54.7 43.5 5.6 40.2 0.2 0.1 51.1
25.7 27.1 72.0 22.5 30.4 6.5 43.4 31.4 56.3 13.5
Deemark 293 35.8 363 36.7 723 16.3 34.4 0.0 0.5 5.4
9.5 10.9 20.9 9.8 11.1 0.2 46.5 5.9 38.0 5.0
Pruace50.1 28.6 26.1 33.0 64.6 113 35.1 35.5 39.0 21.3
31.3 27.4 53.3 25.0 21.9 0.3 7841 42.8 45.6 18.3
West Germany 16.1 23.9 16.6 302 71.9 2.9 32.2 0.2 0.0 3.5
13.7 14.5 28.5 13.3 8.8 0.5 51.6 8.8 56.2 7.2
Greece 6.2 12.9 20.1 11.8 33.5 41.2 43.6 6.9 41.9 2.9
26.1 26.4 61.8 22.6 4.4 0.1 $0.4 16.5 71.9 10.2
Ireland 19.6 19.9 21.2 19.5 55.5 10.5 4.4 0.0 0.0 9.3
13.4 13.8 29.1 12.8 17.6 0.0 19.2 0.3 67.9 6.3
Italy 7.3 16.2 32.1 12.0 49.0 0.3 33.8 0.1 0.0 1.0
11.0 11.9 47.6 6.0 4.4 0.2 47.0 6.9 16.8 3.1
Netherlands 29.3 32.3 38.3 28.0 72.4 8.9 15.9 0.0 0.2 8.7
25.8 27.1 68.8 15.3 6.7 1.7 35.7 6.8 53.3 11.6
United Kingdom 23.3 27.4 24.4 30.4 78.6 18.0 26.8 5.8 0.0 5.0
15.4 17.0 44.5 132 26.0 0.6 40.4 16.7 46.7 6.8
Australia 43.7 27.9 21.6 28.6 29.1 48.5 42.5 62.5 0.0 22.3
23.6 23.4 47.7 22.7 28.1 51.6 57.8 46.8 0.7 21.7
Austria 13.8 19.2 40.5 6.1 1541 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0
4.5 4.7 39.9 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 3.3
Finland 38.4 26.9 28.7 27.5 63.0 56.2 15.8 0.0 0.0 0.6
10.9 7.4 32.6 5.5 23.5 72.0 42.8 0.0 0.0 0.5
Japan 12.1 17.5 53.3 4.4 13.0 36.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3
21.4 16.9 36.8 9.7 11.0 27.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.6
Norway 16.8 16.2 15.4 20.9 59.5 20.5 20.6 0.0 43.9 5.0
4.3 4.9 27.0 32 39.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
Switzer and 43.4 34.5 67.3 19.5 45.8 0.0 7.7 10.1 0.0 3.6
27.2 22.4 74.9 17.4 60.9 0.0 3.8 28.9 1.1 15.1
United States 54.0 18.9 25.1 18.6 64.0 16.7 48.9 5.3 0.0 5.4
26.0 16.6 23.5 16.5 31.1 0.0 35.6 5.2 34.7 6.4
All markets 34.3 22.5 31.2 21.3 57.2 17.3 31.4 6.1 5.0 11.0
21.0 17.1 40.5 14.5 23.3 3.5 34.3 11.8 31.4 9.8
Nose: The top figure la the table body rereet: developingcunre and the bottom A igrIndustrial cutre.
Source: Nogues, Olechowskt, and Winters (1985, p. 4i3)"
Table 5
SUMMARY OF EFFECTS ON THE MAJOR INDUSTRIALIZED)
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DUEi TO
ELIMINATION OF AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES. ALL TARIFFS AND NIBS IN DEVELOPED COUNTIRIES
PCT PCT
VALUE OF CHANGE VALUE OF CHANGE GROSS CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE
IN EXPORTS IN IMPORTS IN EMPLOYMENT' % CHANGE IN IN EFF. IN


























































































































































































































































































































































ALL COUNTR IE S
1. 1 1091.3 1.0 1319.3 0.36 0.80
-0.0535220.6 4.7 34091.7 4.5 5270.4 0.63 0.0
'REFERS TO 51UM OF CHANGES IN THE HOME AN
NPOSITIVE " APPRECIATION.
O~ EXPORT SECTORS WITHIN INDUSTRIES.
'INDEX OF IMPORT AND HOME PRICES.
t ' A
Table 6
Economic Growth Rates in the Asian and Latin American NICs, 1963-85
1973-85 1973-85 1963-85
Country AY(YIP) AYYIP) AY Y
Y (Y/P) Y (YIP) Y (YIP)
East Asian NICs
Hong Kong 8.2 6.0 8.7 6.3 8.5 6.2
Korea 9.6 7.1 7.3 5.7 8.7 6.8
Singapore 11.6 9.5 7.9 6.5 9.5 7.8
Taiwan 10.7 7.6 7.9 5.9 9.2 6.8
Southeast Asia
Indonesia 6.9 4.6 5.9 3.6 7.0 4.6
Malaysia 6.6 3.9 7.0 4.5 7.1 4.5
Philippines 5.2 2.2 4.0 1.3 5.1 2.3
Thailand 8.0 4.9 6.6 4.3 7.2 4.5
India 3.5 1.1 4.4 2.1 3.8 1.5
Latin American NICs
Argentina 4.8 3.2 0.2 -1.4 2.4 0.8
Brazil 8.3 5.5 4.3 1.9 7.1 4.6
Mexico 7.8 4.4 4.8 1.9 6.3 3.2
Note: AY/Y = rate of growth of gross domestic product (GDP); i(Y/P)/(Y/P) = rate of growth of per capita GDP.
Source: Adapted from Balassa (1988, p. S283).
Table 7
Exports of Nonfuel Primary Products and Manufactures and Market Shares
of the Asian and Latin American NICs, 1963-84




Products Manufactures Products Manufactures Products Manufactures
Country Value % Value %' Value % Value % Value % V
East Asian NICs 469 6.6 938 47.6 1,406 7.7 11,016 66.5 5,117 10.0 78,666 69.7
Hong Kong 53 0.7 615 31.2 125 0.7 3,650 22.0 542 1.1 16,913 15.0
Korea 45 0.6 39 2.0 473 2.6 2,700 16.3 1,737 3.4 26,681 23.7
Singapore 168 2.3 158 8.0 108 0.6 998 6.0 670 1.3 7,374 6.5
Taiwan 203 2.8 126 6.4 700 3.8 3,668 22.2 2,168 4.2 27,698 24.6
Southeast Asia 2,499 34.9 95 4.8 6,738 36.8 929 5.6 17,890 34.9 12,040 10.7
Indonesia 425 5.9 2 0.1 1,533 8.4 61 0.4 3,839 7.5 2,201 2.0
Malaysia 955 13.3 49 2.5 2,511 13.7 347 2.1 7,109 13.9 4,411 3.9
Philippines 683 9.5 33 1.7 1,493 8.2 277 1.7 2,162 4.2 3,002 2.7
Thailand 436 6.1 11 0.6 1,201 6.6 244 1.5 4,780 9.3 2,426 2.2
India 888 12.4 671 34.0 1,353 7.4 1,561 9.4 3,006 5.9 4,183 3.7
Latin American NICs 3,303 46.1 267 13.6 8,809 48.1 3,000 18.5 25,218 49.2 17,908 10.9
Argentina 1,275 17.8 78 4.0 2,527 13.8 730 4.4 6,353 12.4 1,429 1.3
Brazil 1,352 18.9 42 2.1 4,779 26.1 1,217 7.4 14,937 29.2 11,558 10.2
Mexico 676 9.4 147 7.5 1,503 8.2 1,103 6.7 3,928 7.7 4,930 4.4
Total 7,159 100.0 1,971 100.0 18,806 100.0 16,556 100.0 51,231 100.0 112,797 100.0
LDC Total 18,460 3,430 42,349 22,945 99,095 146,986
Note: Nonfuel primary products include Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) classes 0 + 1 + 2 + 4 + 68; manufactures include classes 5-8
less 68.
Source: Adapted from Balassa (1988, pp. S278-79).
s
Table 8
Average Pre-Tokyo Round Base Rate Tariffs on Industrial Products,
Tokyo Round Offer Rate Tariffs, and Percentage Depth of Cut
for the Major Industrialized Countries in the Tokyo Round




Round Base Round Offer Average
Country Rate (%) Rate (%) Cut (%)
Australiaa 17.0 16.5 2.8
Austria 15.4 12.1 21.5
Canadaa 7.3 5.2 29.1
European Economic Community
Belgium-Luxembourg 8.2 5.9 28.3
Denmark 9.0 6.6 25.8
France 8.3 6.0 27.8
German Federal Republic 8.7 6.3 27.1
Ireland 9.4 6.9 26.7
Italy 7.3 5.4 27.0
Netherlands 9.2 6.8 26.7
United Kingdom 7.3 5.2 27.7
Finland 9.6 7.1 25.2
Japana 3.9 2.9 25.3
New Zealand 18.9 16.7 11.8
Norway 6.9 5.2 24.8
Sweden 6.4 5.0 23.0
Switzerland 3.9 3.1 21.2
United States 6.5 4.3 34.1
All countries 7.8 5.8 26.4
aBased on prevailing rates, which include unilateral reductions in the pre-Tokyo Round tariffs.
Source: Deardorff and Stern (1986, p. 49).
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